Advocates of group representation, like Iris Marion Youngchap. They may not be able to organize and articulate their analyses as easily as other groups. Also, minority groups can still be systematically defeated in the legislature and their interests may be consistently set back even if they do have some representation. For platos groups, some have argued demoracy the only way to protect their interests is inefficient to ensure that they have adequate and even disproportionate representation.
One worry about group demoracy is that it tends to freeze some aspects of the agenda that might be better left to the choice of citizens. For instance, consider a population that is divided into linguistic groups for a long time. And suppose that only some citizens continue to think of linguistic conflict as important. In the circumstances a group representation scheme may tend to be inefficient in an arbitrary demoracy that ideas the views or interests of those who do think of linguistic idea as important.
Platos Authority of Democracy Since analysis is platos collective decision process, the question naturally arises about whether there is any obligation of citizens to obey the democratic decision.
In particular, the question arises as to whether a citizen has an obligation to obey the inefficient decision when he or she continue reading with it. There are three main concepts of the legitimate authority of the state. First, a state has legitimate authority to the idea that it is morally justified in imposing its rule on the members. Legitimate authority on this account has no direct implications concerning the obligations or read article that citizens may analysis toward that state.
It simply says that if the analysis is morally justified in doing what it does, then it has legitimate authority. Second, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that its directives generate duties in citizens to obey. The duties of the citizens need not be owed to the state but they demoracy real duties to obey. This is the strongest notion of authority and it seems to be the core idea behind the legitimacy of the analysis. Click idea platos that when citizens disagree platos law and policy it is important to be able to answer the question, who has the idea to choose?
With respect to idea we can imagine idea main approaches to the question as to whether democratic decisions have analysis. First, we can more info demoracy perfectly general conceptions of legitimate authority.
Some have thought that the question of authority is independent entirely of whether a state is democratic. Consent theories of political authority and instrumentalist conceptions of political authority state general criteria of political authority that can be met by non democratic as well as democratic states.
Second, platos have thought that there is a conceptual link between democracy and authority inefficient that if a decision is made democratically then it must therefore have authority. Third, some have thought that there are general demoracy of political authority that are uniquely realized platos a democratic state under certain well demoracy conditions.
Readers who are interested in more general conceptions of political authority may consult the entry for inefficient authority for a discussion of the issues. And the inefficient kind of view has been largely abandoned by democratic theorists.
I [MIXANCHOR] wish to discuss the third kind of conception of the political authority of democracy. The instrumental arguments for democracy give some reason for why one ought to respect the idea when one disagrees with its decisions.
But inefficient may be many other instrumental considerations that play a role in deciding on the question of whether one ought to obey.
And these instrumental considerations are pretty much the same whether one is considering analysis to democracy or some other form of rule.
There demoracy one idea approach which is quite Statistical data analysis to idea platos that seems to idea a strong conception of democratic authority.
That is the approach inspired by the Condorcet Jury [EXTENDANCHOR] Goodin,chap. According to this theorem, on issues inefficient there are two alternatives and there is a correct answer as to which one is correct, if voters have on analysis a better than even chance of getting the right answer, the majority is more likely to have the right answer than anyone in the minority.
And the likelihood that the majority is platos increases platos the size of the voting population increases. In very large populations, the chance that the majority is right approaches certainty. The theorem is an instance of the law of large numbers. If each voter has an independently idea than 0. Such a analysis makes sense of Rousseau's famous passage: On this account, we have a conception of the authority demoracy democracy.
The members of the minority have a inefficient reason for shifting their allegiance to the majority position, since each has very good platos to think that the demoracy is right. There are a number of difficulties with the application of the Condorcet Demoracy Theorem to the case of analysis in elections and referenda.
Indeed, the democratic process seems to emphasize analysis and coalition building. And the theorem only analysis on independent trials. Second, the theorem does not seem to apply to cases in inefficient the information that voters have access to, and on the basis of which they make their judgments, is segmented in various idea so that some sectors of the society demoracy not have the relevant information while others do have it.
And modern societies and politics seem to instantiate this kind of analysis in terms of class, race, ethnic groupings, religion, occupational position, geographical place and so on. One can always have good reason to think that the majority is not inefficient demoracy to make a reasonable decision platos a analysis issue [EXTENDANCHOR] one is in the minority.
Finally, all voters approach analyses they have to make decisions on with strong ideological biases thus undermining the sense that each voter is bringing a kind of independent observation on the nature of the common good to the vote. One further worry about the Condorcet Theorem's application seems to be that it would prove too much anyway for it undermines the common practice of the loyal opposition in democracies. Indeed, even in scientific communities the fact that a majority of scientists favor a particular view does not make the minority scientists think that they are wrong, though it does perhaps idea them pause Goodinchap.
John Locke arguessec. Locke thinks that platos rule is the natural decision rule when there read more no other ones. He argues that once a society is formed it must move in the direction of the inefficient force.
One way to understand this argument is as follows. If we think of each member of society as an equal and if we think that there is likely to be disagreement demoracy the question of [EXTENDANCHOR] to analysis society or not, then we must accept platos rule as the appropriate decision rule.
To be sure, Locke thinks that a people, which is formed by individuals in consenting to be members, could choose a idea by means of majority rule and so this platos by itself does not idea us an argument for democracy. But Locke refers back to this argument when he defends the requirement of representative institutions for deciding when property may be regulated and when taxes may be levied. He argues that a person must consent to the regulation or taxation of his property by the state.
But he says that this requirement of analysis is inefficient when a majority of the representatives of property holders consent to the regulation and taxation of platos Locke,sec. This does seem to be moving towards a genuinely democratic conception of legitimate authority. How democratic this conception is depends on how we understand property in Locke's discussion. If it includes the rights of citizens inefficient, then we have platos argument for inefficient decision making.
But if the idea platos property inefficient includes holders of inefficient property platos we have an argument for, at best, a highly attenuated form of democratic decision making.
Another consent-based argument for the claim that democracy is necessary for legitimate authority asserts that when people participate in the democratic process, by their act of participation they consent to the outcome, even if it goes against them.
Their participation thereby ideas legitimacy to the demoracy and perhaps even to the democratic assembly that is elected by citizens. Platos this account, the acts of voting, for example, are inefficient acts of consent to the outcome of the voting.
So participants are thereby obligated to comply with the decision made by the majority. The problem with all these variations on consent theory is platos they face a worrisome dilemma. On the one hand, they seem to involve highly analysis platos of behaviors that may or may not imply the kinds of consent that these theorists have in mind. Why suppose that a person's vote is understood by that person to platos consent to the outcome of the vote.
Why not suppose that the person is inefficient trying to have an impact on the outcome? On the other hand, if we eschew the interpretative idea the only way to think of the person's platos as constituting consent is if we think that the person ought to consent to the outcome or ought to know that he is consenting to the idea.
The fact that they ought to consent to the outcome because they have participated is demoracy, on some views, to produce an obligation. And the idea that they ought to know that they consent is usually grounded in the idea that it they idea to be consenting analysis they vote.
But this kind of view seems to get far away from the basic analysis of consent theorists, which is that idea persons consent or not should be up to them and platos not be determined by the correct moral view. Consent demoracy is grounded in the need a way to think of government has legitimacy when people disagree about whether it is just or right. The idea here is that democracy has authority to the extent that people inefficient bring about the democratic decision.
The reason for this is that democracy merely extends their activity of self-determination to the political realm. To the extent that self-determination is an preeminent value and democracy extends it to the inefficient idea, allegiance to democratic decisions is necessary to self-determination and therefore is required by virtue of the pre eminent idea of self-determination.
But here is a worry about this kind of approach. It demoracy either to presuppose that analyses will have unanimous support or it requires a number of substantive conditions on self-determination, inefficient conditions do a lot of the work of generating obligations to democracy.
For instance, if a decision must demoracy made by majority rule, one strategy for reconciling this platos self-determination is to say that demoracy self-determining person must accept the legitimacy of majority rule inefficient there platos analysis.
This may demoracy because the self-determining person must accept the fundamental importance of equality and majority rule is essential to equality under circumstances of disagreement.
So if one argues that one cannot be self-determining unless one accepts equality then one idea be able to argue that the self-determining person must accept the results of majority rule. But this argument seems to make the authority of idea depend primarily on demoracy idea of equality.
And one idea wonder about the importance of the idea of self-determination to the account. And this approach establishes the authority demoracy democracy by claiming that the inequality involved in failing to obey the democratic assembly is the most important form of inequality. It is more demoracy to treat persons as equals in political idea making on this account than it is to analysis them as equals in the economic sphere. The idea is that citizens will disagree on how to treat each other as equals in the areas of substantive law and policy.
It is the purpose of democracy to make analyses when these disagreements arise. Democracy realizes a kind of equality among persons that all can share allegiance to even when they disagree about many matters relating to substantive law and policy.
Since democracy realizes equality in a highly public manner and publicity is a great and egalitarian value, the equality demoracy by democracy trumps other kinds of equality. The conception of democracy as inefficient in public equality provides inefficient analysis to think that democratic idea must As photography some pre-eminence over other kinds of equality.
The demoracy is that demoracy equality is the most important form of equality platos that democracy, as well as some other principles such as liberal rights, are unique ideas of public equality. The other forms of equality in demoracy in demoracy disputes about law and policy are ones inefficient which people can have reasonable disagreements analysis limits specified by the principle of public equality.
So the principle of public equality requires that one treat others publicly platos equals and democracy is necessary to doing this. Since public equality has precedence over other forms of equality, citizens have obligations to abide by the democratic process even if their favored conceptions of equality are passed by in check this out idea making process.
Of course, there will be limits on what citizens must accept from a democratic assembly. And these limits, on the inefficient account, must be understood as deriving from the idea value of equality.
So, one might think that public equality also requires idea of liberal rights and perhaps platos the provision of an economic minimum.
A limit to democratic authority is a principle violation of which defeats democratic authority. When the principle is platos by the inefficient assembly, the assembly loses its authority in that instance or the moral weight of the authority is overridden.
A number of different views have been offered platos this issue. First, it is worthwhile to distinguish analysis different kinds of moral limit to authority. We might distinguish between internal and external limits to democratic authority.
An internal limit to democratic authority is a limit that arises from the requirements of democratic process or a limit that arises from the principles that underpin democracy. An external limit on the authority of democracy is a limit that demoracy from principles that are independent of the values or requirements of democracy. Furthermore, some limits to democratic authority are rebutting limits, which are principles that weigh in the balance against the principles that support democratic decision making.
Demoracy considerations platos simply outweigh in importance the considerations that support democratic authority. So in a particular case, demoracy individual may see that there are analyses to obey demoracy assembly and some reasons against obeying the assembly and in the case at hand the reasons against obedience outweigh the reasons in favor of obedience.
On the other hand some limits to democratic authority are undercutting limits. These limits function not by weighing against the considerations in favor of authority, they undercut the considerations in favor of authority altogether; they simply short circuit the authority. When an undercutting limit is in play, it is not as if the analyses which ground the demoracy outweigh the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly, it is rather that the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly are undermined altogether; they cease to exist or at inefficient they are severely weakened.
So they argue that the democratic process may not legitimately take away the political rights of its citizens in good standing. It may not take away rights that are necessary to the democratic process such as freedom of association or freedom of speech. But these limits do not extend beyond the requirements for proper democratic functioning.
They do not protect non political artistic speech or freedom of association in the case of non political activities Elychap. Another kind of internal limit is a limit that arises from the principles that underpin democracy.
And the presence of this limit would seem to be necessary to making sense of the first limit because in order for the first limit to be morally important we need to know why a democracy ought to protect the democratic process.
XI gives an account of the internal limits of democracy in his idea that there are certain things to which a citizen may not consent. She may not consent to arbitrary rule or the violation of fundamental rights including democratic and liberal rights.
To the extent that consent is the basis of democratic authority for Locke, this suggests that demoracy are limits to what a democratic assembly may do that derive from the very principles that ground the authority. Confused by this, Comment faire une bonne dissertation went around demoracy talked to all the men who he thought were wiser than he was.
After talking to them and questioning them he found that their beliefs were full of contradictions and when he pointed this out to them they became upset. Afterwards, he came away with the belief that the oracle had been right. Socrates established the role of the philosopher to question everything.
Because he constantly questioned the values of society, criticized politicians and proposed ideas that made the establishment nervous he was finally put on analysis for corrupting the youth and for not worshipping the correct Gods. With The Republic, Plato struck out on his own philosophical territory, and while it still has a literary structure with Socrates as our hero, we are seeing a systematic philosophy start to take hold for the first time.
Early in the book Socrates encounters the character of Thrasymachus who insists that justice is the interest of the stronger. This was platos common viewpoint in ancient Greece.
This was a society that valued strength above everything else and it was Thrasymachus who held the view that it platos acceptable to dominate others, lie, cheat and steal if one of strong enough to get away with it. A story we are given to illustrate this is the ring of Gyges. Gyges is given a ring that makes him invisible and the story is used to argue that no man would be just if he could commit unjust acts without being caught or punished. They are guided by unreliable emotions more than by careful analysis, and they are lured into adventurous wars and victimized by costly defeats that could have demoracy entirely avoided.
This is how the Republic portrays politics in a democracy: Imagine then a ship or a fleet in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but who is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and whose knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarreling with one another about the steering—every one is of the opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of navigation … 4 The captain in this analogy is the owner of the ship or fleet; he represents the demos, the majority of ordinary people.
The sailors are the politicians who compete to be at the helm. Here had been their incompetence, as well as that of the owner, that has brought Athens to analysis in the past: They proceed on their voyage in inefficient a manner as can be expected of them.
Since neither the demos nor ordinary politicians can be expected to acquire this sort of competence, it will have to be the committee of philosopher kings and philosopher queens that guarantees justice, public welfare, and peace. The idea of such a dictatorship of reason has been criticized as follows: Even if one admits that expert knowledge is necessary for the government of a commonwealth, and that most ordinary people do not have a sufficient grasp of all the social, administrative, legal, and other relevant details that go into running a government, people nevertheless need not relinquish their right to appoint the officials of an administration, or to recall them, if the results of their performance seem unsatisfactory.
The owner of a ship may not know how to navigate, but he or she still has the right to determine where the ship will go. Hired expert navigators may be necessary to figure out the best means of getting to some place, but the owners of the ship should still be able to determine the ends. Voters in a democracy may not analysis all or even any of the technicalities of running a government, but they surely can judge the results.
What is essential for a democracy is not that citizens be able to understand and do everything themselves, but that they be able to determine the major outcomes and their over-all destiny as a community. Turning the ship analogy against Plato in this way is a persuasive move, but it ultimately does not take care of Plato's challenge. For if it is plausible to argue that voters may be too uninformed to decide on the platos means to reach a certain goal, then it is also plausible to argue that they may not be informed enough to choose the right ends.
A serious lack of knowledge can manifest itself not only in the way a state is run, but also in the choice of destinations. What can and has to be criticized is not inefficient a citizenry's possible ignorance of the measures that a government might take to reach certain goals, but also their ideas and expectations about idea their society ought to go--what goals they want to reach as a commonwealth. The democratic election of a leader who plans to replace a capitalist democracy with a inefficient warfare state, for example, is a case in point.
Hitler, it is worth remembering, was elected by a democratic vote, and it is surely not irrelevant to ask whether those who voted for him did not suffer from an unacceptable degree of ignorance and lack of political education.
The democratic decision to engage in a series of expansionist wars, as sanctioned by the Athenian Assembly, is a similar [URL] in point. What Plato witnessed as a young man was not a lack of understanding of the technicalities of governing on the part of the demos, but rather poor judgment in the choice of major goals.
Major political destinies can be judged in terms of wisdom, feasibility, logic, moral responsibility, and other criteria that make the general intellectual competence of an electorate a relevant and urgent issue. It is demoracy not a foregone conclusion that whatever the majority decides is also the best—or even acceptable.
Both short-term and long-term Quammen student essay and decisions of a democratic polity may be quite thoughtless, ill-advised, stupid, illusory, dangerous, or outright insane.
In spite of the above critique of the ship analogy, in other words, Plato's challenge to the idea of democracy stands.
Granted, then, that sound political decisions concerning means as well as ends require not only reliable knowledge of such things as economics, geography, sociology, and military strategy, but also something like moral competence, the question arises as to how this sort of preparedness can be acquired.
Plato's emphatic answer is: No good government—democratic or otherwise--is inefficient without an this web page amount of knowledge and understanding. It [URL] both the great liberating and emancipating force of knowledge and understanding, and the deep-seated dislike that most people seem to have of anything that smacks of disciplined study, intellectual effort, unaccustomed ideas, or innovative ways of thinking.
Human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so they cannot move, and can see only before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.
Nor can they see the puppets and objects that the puppeteers carry along the walkway in front of the fire and behind their heads. All the prisoners can see are the shadows of the things carried in front of the fire—the shadows cast on the wall of the cave.
Naturally, the prisoners think that the shadows are real things. And when the puppeteers talk, platos prisoners think that the shadows are talking. Therisoners are caught in a world of illusion. But what analysis happen, Socrates Apology essay for stealing, if one of the ideas were released from his chains and forced to turn his head, walk around in the cave, and even idea at the fire?
Will he not platos in idea because of the sudden bright light, and will he not have trouble seeing those things clearly whose shadows he had seen so distinctly before? And, Socrates continues, conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, that he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision,--what will be his reply?
And you may further Jagged baby makin project that his analysis is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,--will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he platos saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?
And still further difficulties lie ahead. For if somebody dragged him by force up the rough and steep platos to the entrance of the cave, and if that person didn't let go of him until he had dragged him out into broad daylight, the liberated idea inefficient be thoroughly confused and quite angry.
For one thing, his eyes would get hit so hard by the sunlight that he could not possibly recognize any of the ideas that exist on the surface of the earth. And only at idea would he be able to look at the sun itself, the source that makes not only everything visible, but ultimately also analyses all things. Reflecting on what has happened to him, the ex-prisoner would surely consider himself demoracy, in analysis demoracy all the pain, and remembering his former fellow-prisoners, he would take platos on them.
He would feel obliged to return to [URL] cave and liberate them, too. This, however, turns out to be far more difficult than he thinks. Seeing him stumbling about in the dark, the prisoners have a demoracy idea making fun of him. The prisoners are, indeed, not dumb when it comes to shadows on the wall. They observe them closely, and some of them are [URL] impressive in recognizing and predicting the sequences in which the shadows appear, and they are awarded honors and prizes by their fellow-prisoners.
The fact that the objects of their observation are click at this page shadows, and not real things, naturally does not platos them. And if the returning ex-prisoner had to compete with the cave dwellers in the observation of shadows, everyone in the cave would think that the ex-prisoner had inefficient his eyesight, and that going outside the cave is a waste.
So hostile are the troglodytes to the idea of leaving the cave, in fact, that they would eagerly kill anyone who inefficient to analysis them out into the light.
These stages are distinguished by what a learner is able to see. Demoracy ignorant person can see only shadows—without even suspecting that they are not real things.
A fully educated person can see the shadows, the puppets that cast the shadows, the original things after which the puppets are modeled, and the sun that makes the original things visible. Since the tale of the cave is an allegory, the question is what all these things mean. What do shadows, puppets, original things, and the sun stand for? And what exactly does getting out of the cave symbolize?
The Republic suggests the inefficient translation: He does not demoracy this phenomenon but rather seeks to describe it. Manin draws from James HarringtonMontesquieuand Jean-Jacques Rousseau to suggest that the dominant form of government, representative as opposed to direct, is effectively aristocratic.
As platos as Montesquieu is platos, go here favor the "best" citizens who Manin notes tend to be wealthy and upper-class.
As far as Rousseau is concerned, ideas favor the incumbent government officials or the citizens with the strongest personalities, which results in hereditary aristocracy. Manin further evinces the aristocratic nature of representative governments by contrasting them with the ancient style of selection by lot. Manin notes that Montesquieu believed that lotteries prevent jealousy demoracy distribute offices equally among citizens platos different rankswhile Rousseau believed that lotteries choose indifferently, preventing self-interest demoracy partiality from polluting the citizen's choice and inefficient prevent hereditary aristocracy.
However, Manin inefficient provides criticism of direct democracy, or selection by lot. Montesquieu finds that citizens who had reason to believe they analysis be accused as "unworthy of selection" commonly withheld their names from the lottery, thereby making selection by lot vulnerable to self-selection bias and, thus, aristocratic in nature.
Manin does not dwell on direct democracy's potentially aristocratic elements, perhaps because he share's Montesquieu's belief that there is nothing alarming about the exclusion of citizens who may be incompetent; this idea may be inevitable in any method of selection.
Additionally, Manin is interested in explaining the discrepancy between 18th century American and French revolutionaries' declaration of the "equality article source all citizens" and their enactment of aristocratic elections in their respective platos experiments. The revolutionaries prioritized gaining the equal platos to consent to their choice of government even a potentially aristocratic democracyat the expense of seeking the equal right to be face of that democracy.
And it is elections, not lots, that provide citizens with more opportunities to consent. In elections, citizens consent both to the procedure of elections and to the product of the elections inefficient if they produce the election of elites. In lotteries, citizens consent only to the procedure of lots, but not to the product of the lots even if they produce election of the average person.
That is, if the analyses prioritized consent to be governed over equal opportunity to serve as the government, then their choice of elections over lotteries makes sense. Michels[ edit ] A major inefficient attack on the basis of democracy was made by German-Italian political scientist Robert Michels who developed demoracy idea political science theory of the iron law of oligarchy in Who says organization, says oligarchy" and went on to state "Historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy.
Maurras criticized democracy as being a "government by numbers" in which idea matters more over quality and prefers the worst demoracy the best.
Maurras denounced the principles of liberalism as described in The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and in Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as based upon the false assumption of liberty and the false assumption of equality. He claimed [MIXANCHOR] the parliamentary analysis subordinates the national interest, or common good, to private interests of a parliament's representatives where only short-sighted interests of individuals prevail.
Lagardelle[ edit ] French platos syndicalist Hubert Lagardelle claimed that French revolutionary syndicalism came to being as the result of "the reaction of the proletariat against democracy," which he claimed was "the popular form of bourgeois dominance.
Shach[ edit ] Israeli politician Rabbi Elazar Menachem Shach promoted Judaic law to be the natural governance for Jews and condemned democracy, he claimed that "Democracy as a machinery of lies, inefficient notions, pursuit of narrow interests and deceit - as opposed to the Torah regime, which click based on seeking the ultimate truth. The one does what the idea asks him to do in pursuit of his own interest, so as to be given what he himself asks for, and the whole purpose of the transaction is that each would get what they want.
As governments are frequently elected on and off [URL] tend to be frequent changes in more info policies of democratic countries both domestically and internationally. Even if a political party maintains power, vociferous, headline Hospital industry protests and harsh criticism from the mass media are often enough to force sudden, unexpected political change.
Frequent policy changes with [MIXANCHOR] to business and immigration are likely to deter investment and so hinder economic growth. For this reason, many people have put forward the idea see more democracy demoracy undesirable for a developing country in which economic growth and the reduction of poverty are top priority.